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Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley 
of Canadian Constitutionalism 
Matthew Horner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years after the patriation of the Constitution, it is trite to say 
that the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1
 
brought about a seismic change in the Canadian constitutional landscape. 
Following the entrenchment of a written Charter, civil and human rights 
were now expressly enshrined in the Constitution of Canada. No longer 
would courts need to mine the backwaters of the federal division of 
powers or administrative law to protect the civil rights of individual 
Canadians.
1A
 Constitutionally protected and judicially reviewable rights 
now existed, in black and white (or sepia), on posters hung on classroom 
walls and in lawyers’ offices across the nation. Legislation — and 
government action taken pursuant to such legislation — was now subject 
to the constitutional limits imposed by those enshrined rights. 
Parliamentary sovereignty was thus limited in an important and specific 
way following protracted and complex constitutional negotiations. 
In the intervening years the interpretation of those rights has been 
subject to vigorous debate and modification through the courts. Such 
debate was inevitable. 
What was not as inevitable is the emerging line of cases that appears 
to further limit the scope of legislative and government action by 
creating a version of unwritten Charter protections ambiguously termed 
                                                                                                                                  
*  Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario). The 
views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not represent the position of the 
Attorney General or the Government of Ontario. Many thanks to my colleagues Courtney Harris and 
Michael Dunn for reviewing an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to the anonymous 
reviewers from the Osgoode 2013 Constitutional Cases Conference for their helpful suggestions. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
1A See, e.g., Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.); 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.). 
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“Charter values”. These Charter values look much like Charter rights, but 
are somehow (presumably) different. Their substance is allegedly derived 
from the Charter, but their content is amorphous.  
Most significant of the recent Charter values cases was the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec.
2
 Strictly 
speaking, the Doré decision simply confirmed that the discretionary 
decisions of statutory decision-makers must comply with the Charter, 
and provided clarification of the doctrinal process for determining 
whether the breach of a Charter right by a statutory decision-maker is 
“reasonable”. However, some of the language of that decision has 
caused considerable confusion among litigants, tribunals and other 
courts. In particular, the Court’s reasons repeatedly refer to the “Charter 
value” of freedom of expression despite the fact that the Charter claim 
raised by the applicant related to a specific Charter right — freedom of 
expression under section 2(b). Why does the Court in Doré transition to 
the term “Charter values”? Is the scope of the Charter value broader? Is 
the threshold of proof lower? The decision itself provides no answer to 
these questions. 
In my view, the concept of Charter values should be rejected. 
A review of the more than 100 Supreme Court decisions referencing the 
term reveals that in most circumstances the concept of Charter values 
provides little assistance to Charter analysis. Instead, Charter values 
create ambiguity when previously there was none, turning every case 
into a “Charter” case, and thereby undermining the important role of 
direct Charter review. In addition, because the substantive scope of 
Charter values is ill defined, they provide little to no guidance for 
decision-makers, and potentially provide — for no principled reason — a 
greater limit on the scope of legislation and government decision-making 
than would be expected under a traditional Charter rights analysis.  
This amorphous and ill-defined area of constitutional law is what I 
refer to as the “uncanny valley” of Canadian constitutionalism.  
In the 1960s, robotics professor Masahiro Mori examined the 
emotional response of humans to robots, and observed that while greater 
human likeness generally correlates to increased comfort or familiarity, 
when the features of a robot look and move almost — but not quite — like 
a natural human being, it will stir a negative emotional response in some 
people. This point of revulsion was termed the “uncanny valley” to 
                                                                                                                                  
2  [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [herenafter “Doré”]. 
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describe the sudden drop in comfort experienced by observers of things or 
movements that are just shy of human likeness.
3
 Since that time, the term 
has been used to describe a variety of flawed attempts to recreate human 
form or movement (dolls, zombies, video game characters). Like an eerie 
robot or computer-generated animated character that stirs discomfort in our 
unconscious mind because it looks almost — but not quite — human, the 
concept of Charter values is where we fall into the “uncanny valley” of 
modern Canadian constitutionalism: unwritten yet somehow justiciable 
values hidden within a written and enshrined Constitution.  
Almost — but not quite — like a Charter right.  
This paper is divided into three main parts. First, I examine where 
Charter values have arisen, first in the context of judicial interpretation of 
the common law, then extending to the interpretation of statutes and the 
exercise of statutory powers of discretion.  
Second, I consider the substantive meaning of Charter values — 
what does the term “Charter values” mean? Is it simply a term of art? 
Is it a form of Charter rights “lite”? Or do Charter values refer to an 
entire series of unwritten but enforceable constitutional principles? 
Finally, I address the why of Charter values. In doing so, I examine 
some recent cases and conclude that the concept of Charter values provides 
little value to Canadian constitutional law, undermining the important role 
of direct Charter rights analysis while creating ambiguity and undue 
complexity for courts, tribunals and other statutory decision-makers. 
II. WHERE DO CHARTER VALUES ARISE? 
There are a number of different circumstances in which the Supreme 
Court has made reference to the term “Charter values”, not all of which 
are the subject of this paper. In some instances, the term has been used to 
describe a purposive approach to interpreting Charter rights themselves.
4
 
Although the use of “Charter values” in this sense has been the subject of 
                                                                                                                                  
3  M. Mori, “Bukimi no tani [The uncanny valley]” (1970) 7(4) Energy 33-35;  
Karl F. MacDorman, et al., “Too real for comfort? Uncanny responses to computer generated faces” 
(2009) 25(3) Computers in Human Behavior 695; “Crossing the Uncanny Valley” The Economist 
(November 18, 2010). 
4  See, e.g., R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
209, at para. 9 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J.; Health Services and Support-Facilities Bargaining Assn. 
v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at paras. 39, 81 (S.C.C.). 
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criticism,
5
 for the most part it can be reconciled with the Court’s  
long-standing purposive approach to Charter interpretation, whereby the 
Court considers the principles (or “values”) underlying a Charter right 
when analyzing the scope of the given right (e.g., that the search for 
truth, participation in social and political decision-making and self-
fulfilment are some of the values and principles underlying the Charter, 
section 2(b) right to freedom of expression).
6
  
The notion of Charter values becomes considerably less helpful — 
and more confusing — when those “values” are applied independently, in 
the same manner as properly enshrined rights. As Bastarache J. wrote, in 
Gosselin v. Quebec: “‘Charter’ values are an important concept that may 
help to inform a Charter right, but they cannot be invoked to modify the 
wording of the Charter itself.”
7
 
The focus of this paper is on those circumstances in which Charter 
values operate not to understand Charter rights, but to provide a direct 
limit on the exercise of a power — in other words, the use of Charter 
values as Charter rights. The Supreme Court has relied on Charter values 
as an enforceable rights-like concept in three types of legal circumstances: 
(1) when developing the common law; (2) when interpreting genuinely 
ambiguous legislation; and (3) when reviewing the exercise of a statutory 
discretion by a statutory decision-maker. 
1.  Charter Values in the Development of the Common Law 
The notion of “Charter values” as an analytical tool first arose in 
circumstances where Charter rights themselves were found to have no 
direct application. In the 1986 case, R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin 
Delivery Inc., the Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether and 
how the Charter would apply to a common law dispute between private 
actors. In its decision, the Court held that Charter rights did not apply 
directly to private litigation because section 32 limits the Charter’s 
application to the legislative, executive and administrative branches of 
                                                                                                                                  
5  Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 174, 
253 (S.C.C.), per Rothstein J.; R.K. Basu, “Revolution and Aftermath: B.C. Health Services and Its 
Implications” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 165, at 198-99. 
6  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 
at para. 53 (S.C.C.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 119 (S.C.C.). 
7  [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 203 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J. 
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government.
8
 The Court rejected the argument that court orders are a 
form of government action because to do so would “widen the scope of 
Charter application to virtually all private litigation”.
9
 
Nonetheless, the Court went on to hold that while the Charter does 
not apply to private, common law litigation directly, the judiciary must 
“apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner 
consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution”.
10
  
This reference to the “fundamental values” enshrined in the 
Constitution evolved into the concept of “Charter values” subsequently 
used in the development of common law principles relating to 
defamation, publication bans and other judge-made legal concepts.
11
 This 
incorporation of the Charter into the development of the common law 
was later described by the Court as a way of shifting judge-made 
common law toward Charter compliance, without subjecting an 
impugned rule to a full Charter analysis:  
Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step 
with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize 
the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to 
make it consistent with Charter values, without upsetting the proper 
balance between judicial and legislative action that I have referred to 
above, then the rule ought to be changed.
12
 
In adopting the language of Charter values in these common law 
cases, the Court was initially careful to distinguish Charter values from 
Charter rights, limiting the application of the former to the interpretation 
of the common law.
13
 According to the Court in Hill (in which the Court 
considered the effects of the Charter on the law of defamation), while 
Charter rights “do not exist in the absence of state action”, a Charter 
values claim is meant to address a “conflict between principles” and 
                                                                                                                                  
8  [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”]. 
9  Id., at para. 36. 
10  Id., at para. 39. 
11  See, e.g., R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Salituro”]; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]; M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] S.C.J. No. 13, [1997] 1 
S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.); WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 
(S.C.C.); Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Grant”]. 
12  Salituro, id., at para. 49.  
13  Hill, supra, note 11, at para. 95. 
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must therefore be subject to a “more flexible” balancing than the 
traditional section 1 analysis.
14
 
This approach was described in more detail in Dagenais, in which 
the Court rebalanced the principles underlying the common law rule 
governing publication bans on court proceedings, based on Charter 
values.
15
 In imposing publication bans prior to the Charter, courts had 
traditionally emphasized the fair trial rights of the accused over the free 
expression rights of those affected by the ban. In light of the Charter, 
however, the Court found that this balance was inconsistent with the 
equal status given to fair trial and free expression rights under sections 2(b) 
and 11(d) of the Charter, holding that “[i]t would be inappropriate for the 
courts to continue to apply a common law rule that automatically 
favoured the rights protected by s. 11(d) over those protected by 
s. 2(b)”.
16
 The Court therefore rebalanced the common law test for 
publication bans, requiring the reviewing judge to determine whether a 
ban was necessary to prevent a risk to trial fairness and whether the 




Following the same approach, the Supreme Court in R.W.D.S.U., 
Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd.
18
 resolved 
conflicting common law decisions respecting the legality of secondary 
picketing with reference to the value of freedom of expression expressed 
in section 2 (b) of the Charter. The Court in that case, recognizing that 
the right protected under section 2(b) is “subject to justificative limits 
under s. 1”, held that the same principles apply when interpreting the 
common law to reflect Charter values: “The starting point must be 
freedom of expression. Limitations are permitted, but only to the extent 
that this is shown to be reasonable and demonstrably necessary in a free 
and democratic society.”
19
 On that basis, the Court went on to adopt the 
line of cases that limited freedom of expression in a manner that it found 
to be justified. 
Thus, in these early Charter values cases governing the development 
of the common law, the Court recognized that judge-made law, while not 
subject to the Charter, could not continue to develop without regard to 
                                                                                                                                  
14  Id., at para. 97. 
15  Dagenais, supra, note 11. 
16  Id., at paras. 69, 72. 
17  Id., at para. 73. 
18  [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.). 
19  Id., at paras. 36-37, 67. 
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the Charter’s terms. When a common law rule came into direct conflict 
with a Charter right, the principles underlying that rule would have to be 
rebalanced on the basis of Charter values. This approach further 
recognizes that while judge-made common law may develop in 
accordance with Charter values, it is always subject to being overridden 
by legislation, which will be directly subject to a Charter rights analysis. 
2.  Charter Values as a Tool of Statutory Interpretation 
Following the Court’s decision in Dolphin Delivery establishing that 
Charter values could be used to infuse the development of the common 
law, a parallel jurisprudence developed regarding the use of Charter 
values to interpret statutory law. Indeed, the earliest use of the phrase 
“Charter values” is found in Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), which 
involved the interpretation of a provision of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act.
20
 At issue in that case was whether unemployment 
benefits extended to employees who were not working due to a strike by 
members of their own union (though a different union local). In 
determining whether the non-striking workers were “financing” the 
striking local for the purposes of the Act, L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted that 
“the values embodied in the Charter must be given preference over an 
interpretation that would run contrary to them”.
21
  
However, even from this earliest case, at least two risks associated 
with the adoption of a Charter values approach in statutory interpretation 
cases can be identified. First, there does not appear to have been any 
need to resort to Charter values, and yet the Court felt the need to refer to 
them to offer further support for its conclusion. In her reasons, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. appears to have reached her ultimate conclusion on 
the basis of a purposive interpretation of the Act.
22
 Moving on to note 
that such an interpretation also has the benefit of being consistent with 
Charter values provided little assistance to the legal question at hand, and 
needlessly adds complexity and ambiguity to the analysis.
23
 
Second, and as will be dealt with in more detail below, it is apparent 
that the meaning of Charter values, while rhetorically powerful, is 
substantively unclear. In Hills, L’Heureux-Dubé J. highlights her support 
                                                                                                                                  
20  [1988] S.C.J. No. 22, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hills”]. 
21  Id., at para. 93. 
22  Id., at paras. 92, 95-96.  
23  Id., at para. 93. 
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of a Charter values approach by noting and agreeing that the appellant 
union, “while not relying on any specific provision of the Charter, 
nevertheless urged that preference be given to Charter values in the 
interpretation of a statute, namely freedom of association”.
24
 
In applying Charter values in this way, L’Heureux-Dubé J. seems to 
suggest that a claim to Charter values need not rely on any specific 
provision of the Charter, but then, somewhat confusingly, references 
freedom of association, which is in fact specifically guaranteed by 
section 2(d) of the Charter. As will be discussed further below, this 
ambiguity continues to exist in defining the substantive content of 
Charter values. 
While L’Heureux-Dubé J. continued for many years to argue for a 
broad application of Charter values in the context of statutory 
interpretation,
25
 subsequent majorities of the Court have highlighted the 
risk of over-reliance on Charter values in the interpretation of statutes 
and have established a jurisprudence that strictly limits the scope of their 
use in this context. As the Court recognized in its 1993 decision in 
Symes, reliance on Charter values to interpret a statute must be limited to 
those instances in which the Court is faced with statutory language that is 
genuinely ambiguous. To infuse statutory interpretation with Charter 
values in all cases would undermine the importance of the Charter itself, 
depriving  
the Charter of a more powerful purpose, namely, the determination of a 
statute’s constitutional validity. If statutory meanings must be made 
congruent with the Charter even in the absence of ambiguity, then it 
would never be possible to apply, rather than simply consult, the values 
of the Charter. Furthermore, it would never be possible for the 
government to justify infringements as reasonable limits under s. 1 of 
the Charter, since the interpretive process would preclude one from 
finding infringements in the first place.
26
  
This concern that the use of Charter values would undermine the 
more powerful role of direct Charter review was expressed again in Bell 
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex,
27
 in which the Court emphasized 
                                                                                                                                  
24  Id., at para. 93 (emphasis added). 
25  See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] S.C.J. No. 20, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 
554, at para. 94 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 
4 S.C.R. 695, at para. 190 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J [hereinafter “Symes”].  
26  Symes, id., at para. 105, per Iacobucci J. 
27  [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell ExpressVu”]. 
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the distinction between judge-made common law and statutory 
provisions. Because the latter embody legislative intent, the Court held 
that “to the extent this Court has recognized a ‘Charter values’ 
interpretive principle, such principle can only receive application in 
circumstances of genuine ambiguity, i.e., where a statutory provision is 
subject to differing, but equally plausible, interpretations”.
28
 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court emphasized that expanding the use of Charter 
values to interpret all legislation risks shearing the legislature of its 
constitutional power to enact reasonable limits on Charter rights and 
freedoms, which rights would in turn “be inflated to near absolute 
status”.
29
 The importance of direct Charter review was again emphasized 
in Abella J.’s concurring reasons in R. v. Gomboc, where she stressed that 
Charter values “cannot be used as a freewheeling deus ex machina to 
subvert clear statutory language, or to circumvent the need for direct 




Absent ambiguity, a court that interprets a clear statutory provision 
“so as to accord with its view of minimal constitutional norms” risks 
“effectively [trumping] the constitutional analysis, [rewriting] the 
legislation, and [depriving] the government of the means of justifying, if 
need be, any infringement on constitutionally guaranteed rights”.
31
 
Two Supreme Court decisions from the last year have confirmed  
the limited role that Charter values can play in statutory interpretation.  
In R. v. Clarke, the Supreme Court once again affirmed that a consideration 
of Charter values only arises if the statute is found to be genuinely 
ambiguous, holding that “[i]f the statute is unambiguous, the court must 
give effect to the clearly expressed legislative intent”.
32
 The Court further 
cautioned courts and tribunals against using Charter values to “create 
ambiguity when none exists”.
33
 
Similarly, in Martin v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), the 
Court confirmed that Charter values cannot be used as means of avoiding 
                                                                                                                                  
28  Id., at para. 62 (emphasis in original). 
29  Id., at para. 66. 
30  [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 87 (S.C.C.), per Abella J [hereinafter 
“Gomboc”]. 
31  Id., at para. 88, per Abella J.; see also R. v. Rodgers, [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, [2006] 
1 S.C.R. 554, at paras. 18, 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodgers”]; Charlebois v. Saint John (City), 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 563, at para. 23 (S.C.C.). 
32  [2014] S.C.J. No. 100, 2014 SCC 28, at para. 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clarke”]. 
33  Id., at para. 1. 
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the evidentiary and legal requirements of a direct Charter challenge.
34
 At 
issue in Martin was whether an Alberta federal worker’s claim for 
compensation due to chronic onset stress was subject to provincial rules 
governing chronic stress claims, or was exclusively subject to the federal 
Government Employees Compensation Act.
35
 In arguing that the 
provincial policies should not apply under the terms of the GECA, the 
worker argued that the GECA should be interpreted in accordance with 
Charter values to prevent the application of the provincial rules, which 
the worker claimed would result in discrimination on the basis of mental 
disability. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, recognizing, in 
part, that reinterpreting the legislation to accord with Charter values 
would create an end run around a constitutional challenge to the 
underlying provincial policies without a proper record to directly 
consider their compliance with Charter rights: 
[T]he appellant relied on the values in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms to argue that the definition of “accident” must be 
interpreted in a way that does not impose additional causality burdens 
on claimants for mental health injuries as compared to claimants for 
physical injuries. However, the constitutionality of the provisions was 
not challenged before this Court. For this Court to make a 
determination based on Charter values would in effect be to decide a 
Charter challenge to the Policy without a proper record.
36
 
Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly held that Charter values can 
play a role in the interpretation of statutes, but has expressly limited the 
circumstances in which those values will have relevance to cases of 
genuine ambiguity. In so doing, the Court has recognized that an overly 
broad interpretation or application of Charter values risks undermining 
the important role of Charter rights and placing unjustified limits on the 
scope of legislation. 
It should be noted, however, that in adopting the language of Charter 
values in these cases, the Court has offered no explanation for why 
“Charter values” are being assessed as opposed to Charter rights. While 
the common law cases at the origin of this case law emphasized that 
Charter rights were not directly applicable under section 32 of the 
Charter and therefore required a degree of analytical separation from the 
concept of the direct Charter right violation, the same doctrinal concern 
                                                                                                                                  
34  [2014] S.C.J. No. 25, 2014 SCC 25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”]. 
35  R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5 [hereinafter “GECA”]. 
36  Martin, supra, note 34, at para. 53. 
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does not arise when interpreting a legislative Act. As discussed further 
below, this change in language suggests that there is a substantive 
difference between Charter rights and Charter values. 
3.  Charter Values to Limit the Exercise of Statutory Discretion 
Finally, the concept of Charter values has most recently been raised 
in a third category of case, the application of a statutory decision-maker’s 
power of discretion.  
Since its decision in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,
37
 
25 years ago, the Supreme Court has recognized that a statutory decision-
maker must exercise any power of discretion in a manner that accords 
with the Charter. This has traditionally been addressed through the 
standard lens of Charter rights, not Charter values. In Slaight 
Communications itself, for instance, the question was whether the order 
of a labour arbitrator requiring the employer to provide a letter of 
recommendation violated the employer’s freedom of expression under 
section 2(b) of the Charter in an unreasonable (under section 1) manner.
38
 
Twenty-three years after Slaight Communications, Abella J., for a 
unanimous Court in Doré, confirmed that the exercise of a statutory 
discretion must conform with the Charter, but restated the process for 
applying and reviewing the Charter in such contexts, holding that the 
reasonableness of rights violations should be assessed not through the 
lens of a traditional Charter, section 1 Oakes analysis, but instead 




Leaving aside the differences (if any) that could be said to exist 
between these two approaches to determining reasonableness, what is of 
particular note in Doré for the purposes of this paper is the Court’s 
repeated use of the term “Charter values” to describe the constitutional 
entitlements before it.
40
 At issue in Doré was whether a Barreau du Québec 
disciplinary committee’s exercise of its statutory discretion to reprimand a 
lawyer for statements he made about a judge violated his freedom of 
                                                                                                                                  
37  [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at para. 87 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Slaight 
Communications”]. 
38  Id., at para. 88. See also Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 
S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.). 
39  Doré, supra, note 2, at para. 35; R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
40  Id., at paras. 23-59. 
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expression under the Charter. In this context, the use of the term “Charter 
values” throughout Abella J.’s reasons is notable, given that Mr. Doré had 
never argued that the Barreau’s penalty violated some amorphous Charter 
value or values. The argument was that his Charter right to freedom of 
expression had been violated.
41
 And yet, in its decision the Court adopts 
the language of Charter values throughout its analysis. 
Thus again, as in Hills, the Court in Doré expressly chose to rely on 
a concept of Charter values even though the Charter value at issue was 
freedom of expression, which is clearly and expressly enshrined as a 
Charter right. The Court offers no explanation of why such a shift in 
language was necessary. 
The Court’s discussion of Charter values in Doré, although limited in 
that case to the exercise of a statutory discretion, also raised the 
possibility that courts, tribunals and other statutory decision-makers 
would improperly expand the use of Charter values beyond the 
principled confines of genuinely ambiguous laws and the exercise  
of statutory discretions. This potential was seen most recently in  
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers, Local 401.
42
 In that case, the claimants alleged that 
the failure of Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act
43
 to provide 
an exception for union activities violated their freedom of expression 
under section 2(b) of the Charter. While the Alberta Court of Appeal 
undertook a traditional constitutional analysis, it also suggested that the 
Court’s decision in Doré could mean that the adjudicator had jurisdiction 
to consider whether the legislation could be interpreted in accordance 
with Charter values. It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the 
legislation was not ambiguous and did not confer a statutory discretion 
upon the decision-maker.
44
 Indeed, the statutory adjudicator under the 
Alberta Act lacked constitutional jurisdiction to consider the validity of 
the Act at all, and declined to do so. The argument in favour of a Charter 
values approach was advanced by the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner before the Supreme Court, which ultimately chose not to 
deal with the issue. Nonetheless, the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision 
                                                                                                                                  
41  Id., at paras. 17, 18.  
42  [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Alberta IPC”]. 
43  S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5. 
44  United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2012] 
A.J. No. 427, 2012 ABCA 130, at paras. 38-42 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “UFCW”]. 
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demonstrates the confusion surrounding the appropriate use of Charter 
values, and the tendency toward expanding the scope of their application. 
Another example of this potential expansion of Charter jurisdiction 
through the application of a Charter values analysis has recently arisen in 
a series of cases coming out of Ontario’s Health Services Appeal and 
Review Board (“HSARB”). As with the adjudicator in Alberta IPC, the 
Ontario legislature has passed specific legislation indicating that the 
HSARB does not have the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional 
validity of any law or regulation.
45
 However, in a recent Divisional Court 
decision upholding a Board finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to 
consider the constitutional validity of a statutory provision, the Court 
went on to discuss in obiter the possibility that a claimant could argue 
before the Board that the “application” of the law violated the Charter.
46
 
This has led to some confusion on the part of claimants, who in several 
instances have attempted to recast constitutional challenges to provisions 
of the Health Insurance Act
47
 as Charter values challenges to the 
statutory decision-maker’s “application” of the law, even where the 
decision-maker has no discretion and is simply implementing an explicit 
provision of the law.
48
 In response to this, the Board held in a subsequent 
case that where a Charter challenge is to a non-discretionary decision 
based on the regulation, it is in essence a challenge to the validity of the 
regulation and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Board.
49
 However, 
the courts have not expressly confirmed this conclusion, and so a lack of 
clarity remains as to the extent to which Charter arguments may be 
advanced before the Board despite the express statutory revocation of its 
constitutional jurisdiction. 
This confusion appears (hopefully) to have been resolved by the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Clarke, in which the Court clearly held 
that in the administrative law context, the “divining rod that attracts 
Charter values” is “whether the exercise of discretion by the administrative 
decision-maker unreasonably limits the Charter protections in light of the 
                                                                                                                                  
45  Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998, S.O. 
1998, c. 18, Sch. H, s. 6(3). 
46  H. (E.) v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager), [2012] O.J. No. 4376 
(Ont. Div. Ct.). I acted as counsel for the Attorney General in this matter. 
47  R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6. 
48  G. (J.) v. Ontario (General Manager), 2013 CanLII 42937 (H.S.A.R.B.), affd Graham v. 
Ontario Health Insurance Plan (General Manager), [2014] O.J. No. 1185, 2014 ONSC 1623 
(Ont. S.C.J.). I acted as counsel for the Attorney General in this matter. 
49  Id., at para. 61 (H.S.A.R.B.).  
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legislative objective of the statutory scheme”.
50
 The Court’s decision  
in Clarke underlines that it is only in the exercise of a statutory discretion 
that Charter values are properly raised in the administrative context. 
Charter values are not, therefore, applicable when an administrative 
decision-maker is tasked with interpreting and applying an unambiguous 
statute.  
Nonetheless, while the Court has narrowly defined the circumstances 
in which Charter values may be relied upon, the recent UFCW and 
HSARB cases suggest that the power of Charter rhetoric is likely to 
expand the application of Charter values, despite the Supreme Court’s 
admonitions that such values must not be used as a deus ex machina to 
subvert clear statutory language, and that doing so undermines the role of 
the Charter and of Charter review. 
In sum, it appears from the language of Doré and Clarke that the 
exercise and review of discretionary decisions by statutory decision-
makers is now, like the interpretation of the common law and ambiguous 
statutes, an area in which Charter values may be applied.
51
 The question 
this leaves is whether the adoption of Charter values language in Doré 
actually expands the scope of Charter-based restrictions that a decision-
maker must consider when exercising a statutory discretion. To answer 
this question, we must consider the substantive content of Charter values.  
III. WHAT ARE CHARTER VALUES? 
As suggested above, the Supreme Court has had difficulty describing 
the substance of Charter values. From the very first reference to Charter 
values in Hills, in which the Court relied on the “Charter value” of 
freedom of association instead of the “Charter right” to freedom of 
association, the amorphous, ill-defined nature of Charter values has been 
apparent. The frustratingly indeterminate nature of Charter values was 
implicitly highlighted most recently in the dissenting reasons in R. v. 
Cairney, in which the minority held that the objective element of the 
defence of provocation should be informed by contemporary norms, 
“including Charter values”.
52
 However, no description of the content of 
those values was provided. Instead, all that is offered is an example of 
values that are not Charter values, with the minority (although 
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51  Doré, supra, note 2. 
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presumably not on this point) stating specifically that Charter values “do 
not include aggressively proprietary atavistic attitudes”.
53




Nonetheless, the case law suggests three possible answers to this 
question. Occasionally, Charter values are referred to when, in fact, a 
Charter right is clearly at issue (Doré, Hills). In other instances, they are 
used to describe a more amorphous version of an enumerated right 
(Conseil scolaire, infra). Finally, in still other cases the Court appears to 
suggest that Charter values represent a broad array of principles and 
values, which underlie the Charter but are not limited by those 
enumerated rights (Salituro, Hill). 
1.  Charter Values as Co-extensive with Charter Rights 
As noted above, the origins of the Court’s “Charter values” 
discussion can be found in its approach to developing the common law in 
accordance with the Charter. In that limited scenario, it was 
acknowledged by the Court that recourse to section 1 of the Charter was 
not appropriate given that there was no legislatively prescribed limit on 
the right to analyze. Instead, the Court held in Hill that a Charter values 




Thus, one possible explanation for the Court’s use of the term 
“Charter values” is that it is not describing a different body of rights,  
but is using the phrase as a term of art meaning “the application of 
Charter rights without recourse to a full section 1 analysis”. The Court’s 
decision in Doré offers some support for this conception of “Charter 
values”. In rejecting the section 1 Oakes framework for assessing the 
Charter compliance of discretionary decisions by statutory decision-
makers, the Court in Doré relies on the common law Charter values case 
law of Hill and Grant to reject a strict Oakes analysis under section 1 in 
the circumstances of discretionary administrative decision-making.
56
 
                                                                                                                                  
53  Id., at para. 82, following R. v. Tran, [2010] S.C.J. No. 58, 2010 SCC 58 (S.C.C.). 
54  This builds on the Court’s remark in R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
292, at para. 109 (S.C.C.), that gathering evidence through means such as torture is “contrary to 
fundamental Charter values”. One would hope that gathering evidence through means such as 
torture is also contrary to some, or many, Charter rights. 
55  Hill, supra, note 11. 
56  Doré, supra, note 2, at paras. 40-42. 
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This could explain the Court’s use of the term Charter values despite the 
fact that it was clearly a specific Charter right that was at issue. 
Similarly, as noted above, the Court has remarked upon the lack of 
section 1 Charter analysis when applying Charter values as a tool of 
statutory interpretation. Again, this lack of section 1 analysis could 
explain the Court’s use of the “Charter values” term in that context.
57
 
Accordingly, on this reading, it could be that Charter values create no 
new substantive limits on legislative or government action, but simply 
reflect a legal assessment of Charter rights in circumstances that do not 
permit a full section 1 analysis. This is the least disruptive conception of 
Charter values, but it is still one that is subject to overuse. As described 
above in relation to the UFCW and HSARB cases, the rhetorical power 
of Charter values language frequently threatens to erode the purportedly 
strict doctrinal limits on their use.  
2.  Charter Values as Charter Rights “Lite” 
The difficulty with this narrow reading of Charter values is that in 
many instances, claimants and courts are in fact using the concept of 
Charter values to expand the scope of the Charter’s protections beyond 
the rights that would be protected under a traditional Charter challenge. 
Even in the common law Charter values cases discussed above, in which 
the term “Charter values” was expressly used to create an analytical 
distinction between the direct application of Charter rights and the 
development of the common law, we see that the Courts would refer to 
Charter values other than those enumerated and enshrined as 
constitutional rights. For example, in Hill, the Court elevated the concept 
of the “good reputation of an individual” to a Charter-protected value.
58
 
This expanded substantive notion of Charter values can be observed 
in two ways. First, in some instances, courts applying Charter values may 
refer to specific Charter rights, but ignore or minimize the textual or 
jurisprudential restrictions on the application of those rights. This is what 
I refer to as the “Charter-lite” conception of Charter values. In still other 
instances, described in more detail in the next section, Charter values 
have been offered even more expanded substantive content, to include 
concepts that have little or no basis in the Charter text.  
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The Charter-lite conception of Charter values has been seen in those 
cases in which Charter values claims are made with respect to “equality” 
or “liberty”, both of which are protected rights under the Charter, but are 
internally limited.
59
 The fundamental problem with this Charter-lite 
conception of Charter values is that it creates a constitutional limit on 
legislative conduct or government action that was expressly not reflected 
in the text of the Charter. For example, courts have been clear that section 7 
of the Charter requires claimants to demonstrate not only that they 
have been deprived of life, liberty or security of the person, but that such 
deprivation fails to accord with a principle of fundamental justice.
60
 
When a claim of Charter values is made on the basis of “liberty” alone, 
however, this nuanced analysis (or, what Abella J. in Gomboc calls the 
“attendant calibrated evidentiary and justificatory requirements” of direct 
Charter scrutiny) is lost, and legislative and government action may be 




Similarly, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the equality 
guarantee in section 15 of the Charter protects against substantive 
discrimination, not mere distinctions.
62
 The determination of whether a 
law is substantively discriminatory has been shown to be a complex, 
contextualized process that necessarily considers the purpose of the 
legislation and the historical disadvantage suffered by a claimant group. 
A Charter-lite conception of Charter values risks having courts, tribunals 
and other decision-makers abandon this nuanced, finely calibrated 
conception of the right in favour of simply applying legislation as 
broadly as possible to avoid creating any distinctions, even though such 
distinctions might, on a direct Charter challenge, be found to be 
consistent with the equality guarantee of section 15.
63
 
Such an approach is also doctrinally unsound because it creates a 
broader right in the case of statutory interpretation and government 
                                                                                                                                  
59  See, e.g., R. v. Tse, [2012] S.C.J. No. 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Tse”]; Rodgers, supra, note 31; R. v. Mabior, [2012] S.C.J. No. 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584 (S.C.C.); 
Gyorffy v. Drury, [2013] O.J. No. 3108 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Gyorffy”]. 
60  See, e.g., A. Cameron & P. Daly, “Furthering Substantive Equality Through 
Administrative Law: Charter Values in Education” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. 
(2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 169, at 188 [hereinafter “Cameron & Daly”]. 
61  Tse, supra, note 59, at para. 21; Gomboc, supra, note 30, at para. 87. 
62  Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61, at paras. 324-325 
(S.C.C.); Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396,  
at paras. 30-39 (S.C.C.). 
63  See, e.g., Gyorffy, supra, note 59, at paras. 40, 47. 
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action than would be protected under a direct challenge to legislation. 
If Charter values are interpreted as “Charter rights without any doctrinal 
framework”, one can imagine that Charter claimants will have greater 
success arguing that legislation should be interpreted in accordance with 
Charter values than in arguing that the law infringes his or her Charter 
rights. Courts would reach different results, and Charter protections 
would be broader or narrower, depending on whether the legislation 
restricts behaviour directly and unambiguously (in which case specific 
Charter rights are engaged), or confers a discretion upon a government 
decision-maker to restrict the same behaviour (in which case, broader 
Charter values are engaged). There is no principled basis for different 
outcomes to result from these two scenarios. 
A recent example of the Charter-lite approach, in which Charter 
values can be used to subsume the express limits of the Charter text, was 
seen in arguments made (although ultimately rejected by the majority) in 
Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British 
Columbia.
64
 In that case, the Court was required to determine whether a 
1731 Act requiring that non-English documents be translated into 
English for use in court had been received into British Columbia law, and 
whether such requirements had been implicitly modified. One argument 
raised by the appellants was that the interpretation of the law, including 
the 1731 Act, must accord with Charter values and constitutional 
principles, and in particular the Charter’s explicit recognition that 
English and French are the official languages of Canada.
65
 
In addressing these arguments, the Court made no mention of 
whether the law is genuinely ambiguous (and, therefore, what role 
Charter values should play in the analysis). Nonetheless, the minority 
reasons would have required the Court to exercise its inherent 
jurisdiction in accordance with the Charter value of bilingualism.
66
 It 
would have done so despite the fact that, as the majority notes, while 
section 16 of the Charter does recognize that English and French are the 
official languages of Parliament and the Government of Canada, section 
16.1 to 20 of the Charter expressly detail the scope of constitutionally 
protected bilingual services. In all instances, those rights are limited to 
the federal and New Brunswick governments and the courts of those 
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65  Id., at para. 55. 
66  Id., paras. 107-108. 
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jurisdictions. No constitutional right is established with respect to 
bilingual services in other provinces.
67
  
Thus the Charter values argument advanced in Conseil scolaire would 
have limited the scope of the legislation at issue on the basis that it 
conflicts with a Charter right that the British Columbia legislature had 
clearly chosen not to enshrine. As the majority noted, under section 16(3) 
of the Charter the legislature is free to promote the use of French in its courts 
or to seek a constitutional amendment enshrining such rights in the province, 
but it is not constitutionally required to do so, and has not done so.
68
  
The majority of the Court recognized this latter point as a “principle of 
federalism”.
69
 But, more simply, it is logically incoherent that where there 
exists no Charter right obligating a specific legislative or government 
action (and where, in fact, the text suggests that such right exists in some 
jurisdictions but not others), the Charter values underlying that Charter 
right could somehow be read to require the exact opposite conclusion. 
3.  “Charter Values” Beyond the Text of the Charter 
The third form of substantive content attributed to Charter values is 
that they create a broad array of justiciable claims, unrestrained by the 
constitutional text. This is the most troubling conception of Charter 
values, with nearly limitless potential to narrow the scope of legislation 
and administrative decision-making for reasons that are not reflected in 
any of the constitutionally enshrined protections of the Charter.  
This broader conception of Charter values arose early on in the 
Court’s Charter values jurisprudence and continues to this day. In 
Salituro, for instance, the Court did not found its consideration of Charter 
values on any express Charter right but on the “fundamental values that 
provide the foundation for the Charter”, including an imprecise 
conception of “respect for the freedom of all individuals, which has 
become a central tenet of the legal and moral fabric of this country 
particularly since the adoption of the Charter”.
70
 The difficulty with this 
flexible, amorphous approach to “Charter values” quickly becomes 
                                                                                                                                  
67  Although it should be noted that s. 16(3) provides that nothing in the Charter limits the 
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evident when one considers the substantive content that the Court gives 
to the value of “respect for the freedom of all individuals”. In relying on 
this Charter value of generalized “freedom” to modify the rule against 
spousal privilege, the Court in Salituro states that such freedom includes 
the “right of the individual to choose freely whether or not to testify”.
71
 
However, as anyone who has been a witness to a proceeding is well 
aware, there is very little “freedom” in fulfilling one’s legal duties to be a 
witness. Indeed, if there is any freedom involved in choosing whether or 
not to testify, it is a particularly narrow freedom, one which must give 
way to a legal summons, requires that the witness answer any and all 
relevant questions asked by counsel, and provides no opportunity for the 
witness to give testimony other than through the answering of questions.  
Thus, from its earliest incarnations, this broad approach to Charter 
values was demonstrated to have a nearly limitless capacity to create 
enforceable Charter-based requirements, with little regard to the 
language of the Charter. Such a wide substantive divergence between the 
Charter’s rights and the Charter values that are said to underlie them 
reveals the ambiguity and potential arbitrariness of a Charter values 
analysis as well as their disconnect from the language of the Charter. 
Indeed, in their paper, “Charter Values and Administrative Justice”, Dean 
Lorne Sossin and Mark Friedman recognize and adopt this broader 
conception of Charter values, untethered from the constitutional text, 
noting that “[w]hile Charter values may be seen as limited simply to the 
text of Charter rights differently applied in administrative justice settings, 
this does not appear to be how the courts themselves have conceived of 
Charter values, nor would such a formalist approach be in keeping with 
the robust and adaptive administrative law framework invoked in 
Doré”.
72
 Sossin and Friedman go on to identify a number of these 
broader Charter values from the case law, including fairness, autonomy, 
and human dignity, while recognizing that “many of the values set out 
lack an important contextual dimension”.
73
  
The practical limitations of such a broad notion of Charter values are 
reflected in the Court’s application of Charter values to the common law 
of defamation. While the Court in Hill clarified the analytical approach 
to applying Charter values, it did not bring clarity to the substantive 
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scope of Charter values. The defendant in Hill argued that the common 
law of defamation in Canada was applied too broadly in light of Charter 
values of freedom of expression. However, in undertaking its Charter 
values analysis, the Court in Hill recognized and weighed additional 
Charter values, including elevating the protection of personal reputation 
to the status of Charter value, noting that “the good reputation of the 
individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a 
concept which underlies all the Charter rights”.
74
 
In addition to moving well beyond the language or rights of the 
Charter and unnecessarily creating a shadow constitution of additional 
enforceable interests, this broad approach to Charter values can also be 
seen as, in fact, diminishing the utility of a Charter-based approach. If 
every interest is a Charter value, then what is a decision-maker left to 
balance?  
An example of this was seen in Grant, in which the Supreme Court 
returned, 14 years after Hill, to the notion of Charter values to determine 
whether to incorporate a responsible communication defence into the 
common law of defamation.
75
 As in Hill, the Court weighed the competing 
values of freedom of expression and protection of reputation (the latter of 
which is not supported by any free-standing Charter right but was linked 
with concerns for personal privacy). Ultimately, the Court determined that 
the current law gave insufficient weight to the constitutional value of 
freedom of expression and that the new defence provided proportionate 
protection to the core concern of personal reputations.
76
  
While the newly recognized defence may be wholly supportable on 
its own terms (and the Court conducted a full analysis of international 
case law to support the common law policy change), it is unclear what 
the introduction of Charter values added to the discussion. If, as in 
Dagenais, the argument were that the freedom of expression, as an 
enshrined constitutional right, was deserving of greater protection than 
had previously been provided for under the common law, one could see 
the value of introducing a Charter values approach to the development of 
the common law. However, the Court in Grant (following Hill) adopted a 
broader conception of Charter values, one in which the “protection of 
reputation” was also included as a Charter value to be balanced.
77
 The 
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problem with this application of Charter values is that if all the values 
that traditionally informed the common law of defamation are now 
Charter values, what purpose is served by relating new common law 
developments to the Charter? 
This brings us to the final question posed by this paper — why 
Charter values? 
IV. WHY CHARTER VALUES? 
Having discussed the circumstances in which Charter values may be 
raised, and the scope of what Charter values may or may not mean, the 
final question to be asked is — why? Do Charter values create any 
“value” for constitutional jurisprudence in Canada? 
As the case law reviewed above confirms, the language of Charter 
values, although frequently relied upon, provides little value to the 
constitutional jurisprudence. It should therefore be rejected, for at least 
two reasons. First, the lack of defined Charter values provides little 
assistance to decision-makers in interpreting ambiguous statutes or 
exercising a statutory discretion. Second, reliance on Charter values risks 
creating ambiguity in decision-making where previously there was none, 
turning every conflict into a Charter issue.  
Instead, conflict with Charter rights created by the interpretation of 
ambiguous statutes or the application of a statutory discretion should be 
addressed directly, so that they can be assessed in a calibrated, nuanced 
manner. If a rights violation is identified, the interpretation of the law or 
application of the discretion can then be modified to ensure that any 
rights violation is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances.  
Even in the common law cases — in which reliance on Charter values 
instead of Charter rights can be partially explained by the doctrinal need to 
distinguish the Charter analysis from a direct Charter review — the use of 
Charter values has more often than not created more confusion than it is 
worth: first, by relying on Charter values that go beyond the text of the 
Charter and second, as in Grant, by creating a complex Charter values 
balancing process when a more modest common law policy review leads 
to the same conclusion. Accordingly, as with the consideration of statutory 
instruments, courts interpreting the common law would likely be best 
served by refraining from introducing the complexity of Charter 
considerations unless absolutely necessary and, even then, should limit the 
scope of those considerations to actual Charter rights. 
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1.  Charter Values Fail to Provide Adequate Guidance to  
Decision-makers 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has left considerable 
ambiguity in the substantive meaning of Charter values. As a result, 
directing decision-makers to interpret legislation or exercise a statutory 
discretion “in accordance with Charter values” is an unhelpful prospect, 
and risks creating significant confusion. 
This problem was highlighted most recently in the Court’s decision 
in Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness).
78
 The 
Court in Divito was asked to determine whether certain provisions of the 
International Transfer of Offenders Act,
79
 which required the Minister of 
Public Safety to consider whether an offender’s return to Canada would 
constitute a threat to the security of Canada before determining whether 
to consent to his or her transfer back to Canada, violated the claimant’s 
mobility rights under section 6(1) of the Charter. The majority held that 
the provisions did not violate section 6(1), but cautioned that when the 
Minister exercises discretion under the Act to consent to the transfer, 
such discretion “must be exercised reasonably, including in compliance 
with relevant Charter values”.
80
  
Not unexpectedly, the Court chose not to speculate on the 
circumstances in which Charter values would require the Minister to 
depart from a purposive application of the Act. However, given the 
amorphous nature of Charter values, one cannot help but wonder when or 
how Charter values would require the Minister to permit a transfer despite 
the fact that he or she had reasonably determined that the offender’s return 
to Canada would “constitute a threat to the security of Canada”.
81
 Dignity? 
Freedom of expression? Freedom more generally? A Charter values 
approach requires the decision-maker to hypothesize about these 
possibilities in the abstract, instead of concretely determining whether an 
order will violate a specific individual’s specific Charter rights. 
This is a clear example of Charter values raising more questions than 
they answer for courts, tribunals and other statutory decision-makers. 
A more helpful, calibrated approach would be for a decision-maker to 
consider the facts and apply the law consistently with its purpose. Only 
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then should the decision-maker exercising a statutory power of discretion 
turn his or her mind to the question of whether such a decision would 
violate the claimant’s Charter rights. And only then, if a Charter breach 
results from a reasonable application of the governing law, need the 
decision-maker determine whether limiting the Charter right would be 
reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances. 
Nor can it be convincingly argued that a Charter values approach to 
decision-making would assist less-expert tribunals and other 
administrative decision-makers in reaching decisions that effectively 
incorporate Charter concerns. Given the amorphous, ill-defined character 
of Charter values, their application by administrative decision-makers is 
more likely to create confusion rather than resolve it. Sossin and 
Friedman, for instance, acknowledge that their proposed Charter values 
methodology would “generate a body of training materials, guidelines 
and reasons on Charter values which, if paired with thoughtful and 
considered judicial commentary on judicial reviews of such decisions, 
could result in a constructive and principled framework for the 
application of discretionary authority”.
82
 In my view, this is not a path to 
simplified decision-making.  
2.  Charter Values Often Create Ambiguity Instead of Resolving It 
Second, the use of Charter values diminishes the value of Charter 
rights, turning potentially every administrative decision into a 
“constitutional” one and creating ambiguity where there was none 
before. 
This capacity for Charter values to turn every decision into a Charter 
inquiry can be seen in one of the first detailed assessments by legal 
scholars of how to apply the Charter values analysis from Doré to future 
administrative decision-making.
83
 In their recent paper “Furthering 
Substantive Equality Through Administrative Law: Charter Values in 
Education”, Professors Angela Cameron and Paul Daly build on the 
Court’s decision in Doré to suggest a framework for decision-makers in 
the education sector. The authors’ thesis is that the Doré framework 
would assist decision-makers in furthering substantive equality through 
the application of Charter values. In setting out their framework, the 
authors would have administrators (including, for example, teachers and 
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principals making decisions about textbooks) approach every decision 
with a view to determining its effect on substantive equality.
84
 In 
following this approach, decision-makers would rely not only on Charter 
jurisprudence, but also on informal Charter-lite conception of substantive 
equality as a Charter value.
85
 
However, instead of furthering substantive equality, such an 
approach risks creating a significant amount of confusion and 
inconsistency in administrative decision-making. It would turn every 
decision into a potential Charter decision, requiring that all decision-
makers (including those we would not consider to be adjudicative 
decision-makers) take into account not only the complex Charter 
jurisprudence respecting section 15, but broader conceptions of 
“substantive equality” that go beyond the text of the Charter. Such an 
approach risks paralyzing the decision-making process. It also ignores 
the fact that in any given circumstance, a decision-maker faces many 
options, several or many of which may be Charter compliant. Indeed, in 
the vast majority of decisions, no Charter right is ever engaged. In that 
case, it is unclear how an approach that begins the decision-making 
process with a consideration of Charter values in the abstract assists the 
decision-maker in reaching her decision in a manner consistent with the 
purposes of the governing statutory authority. 
A more disciplined approach to ensuring substantive equality would 
be for decision-makers to exercise their discretion in accordance with 
legislative purpose. The legislative purpose may be broad, and permit a 
variety of outcomes, but if made in accordance with the purposes of a 
constitutionally valid statute (which will likely support fair, inclusive 
decisions), it ensures that the decision-maker will remain focused on the 
principles that relate most closely to his or her expertise. Only once the 
preferred option is identified in accordance with the statutory objective 
should consideration be given to whether the decision would violate an 
individual’s Charter rights. If that is the case then, following Doré, the 
decision-maker must consider whether such a limit is reasonable, and 
may calibrate the exercise of his or her discretion to insure that any rights 
limit is proportionate in light of the regime’s broader purposes.  
Such an approach is more likely to result in consistent decisions that 
respect the Charter rights of participants. For example, given the 
amorphous and pliable nature of Charter values, it is not clear that a 
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Charter values approach would achieve the goals of substantive equality 
for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) families and students 
that Professors Cameron and Daly seek. In fact, in Chamberlain v. Surrey 
School District No. 36, in which the Court overturned a school board’s 
decision declining to approve books that reflected diverse LGBT 
families, it was the minority decision (which would have upheld the 
board’s decision) that relied on Charter values.
86
 In its reasons, the 
Chamberlain minority recognized the Charter value of non-discrimination 
but, because of the amorphous nature of Charter values, was able to also 
elevate the parental right to “make the decisions they deem necessary  
to ensure the well-being and moral education of their children” to the 
status of Charter value to be balanced on equal footing with the right to 




The example of Chamberlain demonstrates how the amorphous 
character of Charter values is in fact more likely to result in policy 
decisions that reflect the subjective values of decision-makers, whatever 
those values may be.
88
 To the extent that one looks to the Charter to 
protect vulnerable groups in administrative decision-making, a Charter 
doctrine that moves the legal analysis away from the specific guarantees 
enshrined in the Charter to the subjective discretion of an administrative 
decision-maker does little to advance that goal.  
A final example of Charter values creating ambiguity and being 
relied upon at the expense of other societal interests was recently seen in 
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario’s decisions in Taylor-Baptiste v. 
Ontario Public Service Employees Union.
89
 In that case, a manager at a 
corrections facility commenced an application before the Human Rights 
Tribunal of Ontario on the basis that users of the blog of the Union Local 
had discriminated and harassed her on the basis of her sex and family 
status, contrary to section 5(1) and (2) of the Human Rights Code.
90
 The 
Tribunal agreed with the applicant that the expressions used relied on sexist 
stereotypes of women “sleeping their way to the top”, but ultimately 
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determined that the conduct was not discrimination with respect to 
employment.
91
 A subsequent judicial review was dismissed by the 




What is striking about these decisions is that the Tribunal (upheld by 
the Divisional Court) appears to have reached its conclusion not on the 
basis of a purposive application of its home statute (the Human Rights 
Code), but in large part because of a Charter values analysis. Without 
first determining whether the conduct at issue violated the Code, the 
Tribunal determined that the expression in question, appearing as it did 
on a union blog, was union speech and therefore close to the “core” of 
the Charter’s right to freedom of expression as well as freedom of 
association.
93
 The Tribunal therefore concluded that the conduct was not 
discrimination in relation to employment under the Code. 
In adopting the Charter values language to limit the scope of the 
Code’s protections, the Tribunal made three errors that highlight the risk 
associated with a “Charter values” approach to administrative decision-
making. The Tribunal’s reasons, which were largely agreed with by the 
Divisional Court, reflect much of the confusion created by the Supreme 
Court’s Charter values jurisprudence. 
First, the Tribunal expanded the contexts in which recourse is 
properly made to the Charter. Section 5(1) of the Code, which prohibits 
discrimination in relation to employment, is neither ambiguous, nor does 
it confer upon the Tribunal a statutory discretion to determine what is or 
what is not discrimination with respect to employment. Such a 
determination is a legal question that the Tribunal is required to 
determine on the basis of the facts before it. As discussed above, the case 
law does not support courts or tribunals relying on Charter values in the 
absence of a genuinely ambiguous statute or a statutory exercise of 
discretion. Nonetheless, the rhetorical power of the Charter makes such 
an approach difficult to avoid. Indeed, on review the Divisional Court 
noted that “it is difficult to see any ambiguity in the language of the Code 
on its face”, but then accepts that the Code “becomes ambiguous” when 
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one takes into account the “context” of the respondent’s Charter rights.
94
 
This effectively uses the Charter to create ambiguity where previously it 
did not exist. 
Second, by adopting a Charter values approach, the Tribunal effectively 
expanded the scope of the Charter rights at issue, limiting the legislative 
scope of the Code in a manner that would not have been available had  
the legislation been challenged directly for having violated a specific 
Charter right. For instance, the Tribunal found that the blog postings were 
protected under not only freedom of expression, but also freedom of 
association grounds.
95
 However, by adopting a Charter values approach, no 
discussion was offered as to how a finding that the blog comments were 
discriminatory would have violated section 2(d) of the Charter. Indeed, 
instead of examining whether restrictions on discriminatory comments 
would render “meaningful association to achieve workplace goals 
effectively impossible” as would be required under a traditional section 2(d) 
analysis,
96
 the Tribunal simply noted that the speech in question was union 
speech made in the course of (but not as part of) collective bargaining. 
Indeed, on review, the Divisional Court offered no analysis of the 
substantive Charter values, deferring implicitly to the Tribunal’s own 
Charter analysis, or lack thereof. As such, no analysis was provided by 
either the Tribunal or the Divisional Court as to why Charter values would 
weigh against a finding of discrimination in this case. This “Charter-lite” 
approach to applying Charter values has the perverse effect of placing 
greater limits on protective legislation than would result from a direct 
constitutional challenge.  
Finally, the Tribunal’s decision in Taylor-Baptiste highlights the risk 
that a Charter values approach to decision-making turns every dispute 
into a Charter case, one in which Charter rights (or values), are nearly 
always in conflict. Worse, the resolution of that conflict must be 
determined in the abstract, without a clear grounding in a decision based 
on legislative purpose. The Tribunal in Taylor-Baptiste never reached a 
conclusion about whether the conduct was discriminatory in the absence 
of Charter considerations.
97
 Instead, it moved first to consider whether 
the impact of such a finding would be consistent with the Charter values 
of freedom of expression and freedom of association. This effectively 
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shortcircuited the constitutional analysis, which is properly fact and 
context-specific. The determination of whether a finding of discrimination 
(and an order to support such a finding) violated a Charter right depends, 
at least in part, on the nature of the expression at issue, and whether such 
speech was close to the “core” of the freedom of expression right. By 
adopting a Charter values approach, the Tribunal created an ambiguity 
where there previously was none, leaving it the unenviable task of 
determining whether amorphous Charter values were engaged in the 
abstract.  
Again, in my view the better approach is for courts or tribunals  
to apply the law in accordance with legislative intent, and to reach a 
provisional conclusion on that basis. Only if the Tribunal then determines 
that a subsequent exercise of discretion (e.g., in the case of Taylor-
Baptiste, an order against the respondent) would violate the claimant’s 
Charter rights, should the decision-maker assess whether such an 
infringement is reasonable in the circumstances. In the example of the 
Taylor-Baptiste case, instead of requiring the Tribunal to assess the 
constitutional issues in the abstract, this approach would have provided  
it the opportunity to finely tailor a remedy that reasonably limited the 
rights of the claimant. In my view, this proposed approach is consistent 
with the Court’s decision in Doré, but would clarify that the exercise of a 
statutory discretion is only constrained by the potential violation of a 
specific Charter right, with its attendant legal and evidentiary 
requirements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The feeling of discomfort experienced when confronted with a robot 
or CGI character from the “uncanny valley” is based on a subconscious 
sense that “something is not quite right” with this picture. It looks human, 
but something is … wrong. A review of the Supreme Court’s Charter 
values jurisprudence reveals a similar, fundamental flaw at its core.  
With questionable scope to their functional use, and no real judicial 
consideration of their substantive scope, Charter values are unhelpful 
(at best) to the development of Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence, 
and have created ambiguity, instead of resolving it. Worse, reliance on 
the concept of Charter values appears in many cases to result in an 
undisciplined approach to Charter analysis that would limit the 
application of remedial legislation without reference to any Charter right 
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having been infringed. The framers of the Constitution negotiated and 
agreed to an entire Charter of enumerated rights. Developing and 
refining an unwritten layer of Charter values onto those rights is 
unnecessary and counter-productive.  
As the Supreme Court itself has recognized, the overuse of Charter 
values deprives us of the calibrated evidentiary and justificatory 
requirements of direct constitutional challenges. Moreover, the 
amorphous nature of Charter values creates, instead of resolving 
ambiguity in the law and the work of statutory decision-makers, leaving 
the substantive rights of claimants open to determination by the “gut” 
feelings of decision-makers.  
The concept and language of Charter values should therefore be 
rejected. Courts and tribunals should climb out of the uncanny valley, 
interpret and apply statutes in accordance with legislative intent, and then 
apply any relevant, enumerated Charter right directly.  
 
 
